Introduction
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1 defines the custom of lobolo as:
Property in cash or in kind, whether known as lobolo, bogadi, bohali, xuma, lumalo, thaka, magadi, amabheka or by any other name, which a prospective husband or the head of his family undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife's family in consideration of a customary marriage.
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Various communities in South Africa practise the custom of lobolo, which people give different names, is shown above. These communities may be divided into two groups, those practicing theleka and those that do not. This article will focus on those communities that practise theleka. 3 In the communities practising theleka the amount of lobolo is not fixed and the father or guardian of the wife may from time to time theleka the wife (her married daughter) and demand one to three head of cattle from his son-in-law. 4 The wife and her children, if there are any, may be held by their maternal grandfather until the payment of lobolo has been met. The custom of theleka takes place when a wife visits her home and after the expiry of the normal visiting time she continues to stay at her home and does not return to her husband's home. Her husband then sends messengers to fetch her and they are informed of why she is being held. Theleka is the withholding of a wife by her father or guardian from her husband to coerce him to pay the outstanding lobolo. Theleka can also be practised when the husband has ill-treated his wife, especially by seriously assaulting her. The father of the wife may demand a beast that serves as damages if the husband has ill-treated his wife. The beast paid may be in excess of the lobolo originally specified. See Koyana Customary 12-16. 4 Rautenbach, Bekker and Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism 57. The practice of theleka has an effect on the custody of the child and the relationship of spouses in a customary marriage. The writer draws this conclusion because the wife and her children are held by her guardian or father until the completion of the payment of lobolo. The custom of theleka, which serves as a way of enforcing lobolo amongst Xhosa communities, seems to be in conflict with the best interest of the child as entrenched in the Constitution.
6 This is because the court has to consider various factors before granting an application 7 and it would be unjust if the best interest of the child were to be determined by the payment or non-payment of a certain number of cattle. The South African Law Commission 8 recommended that
Lobolo should not be deemed essential for the validity of customary marriages. If parties wish to give lobolo, they should be free to do so, but payment or nonpayment will have no effect on the spouses' relationship or on their rights to any children born of the marriage. If this recommendation were to be taken seriously, then the continuation of theleka custom may be considered unconstitutional. Unfortunately there is no judgment in South Africa since 1994 that has ruled on this issue. This first section of this article will discuss the enforcement of lobolo. The second section, dealing with custody in customary marriages, will also draw certain inferences. The third section will analyse the notion of the best interests of the child again draw certain inferences. The fourth section analyses and answers two questions, namely: does the custom of theleka constitute abduction? Does the custom of theleka constitute family violence? And it makes recommendations based on the discussion and analysis about what should be done about theleka custom.
The following section discusses the enforcement of lobolo in customary law.
The enforcement of lobolo in customary law In a similar case of Gomani v Baqwa 24 the plaintiff sued for the return of lobolo paid by him to the defendant whose daughter he married according to civil rites. In this case it was alleged that the woman had committed adultery and deserted the plaintiff and thereafter cohabited with Luswazi. This marriage was dissolved by the court of the chief magistrate on the ground that the wife committed adultery. The magistrate held that the dissolution of a Christian marriage has nothing to do with the question of the return of lobolo.
The following section deals with custody in customary law and how it is regulated.
Custody in customary law
Custody is defined by Bekker as:
the capacity of a person to have actual physical "possession" of the minor, to live with him or her, to take care of him or her and to assist him or her in his or her daily life. In communities practicing theleka the wife and her children are held by the guardian or father of the wife until the payment of lobolo is made. This practice has an impact on the custody of the children because the father of the wife gains the possession of her daughter together with her children and lives with them until the payment of further lobolo has been made. To put it differently, the parents-in-law of the husband take custody of his children.
In customary law, the parental rights are determined by the payment of lobolo.
26 If the husband has complied with his duty to pay lobolo, he and his family group have full parental rights to the children had by the wife during the existence of the marriage. Customary law places more emphasis on deciding to which family a child is linked. This is aptly summed up in Madyibi v Nguva 27 as follows:
By nature the progeny of a woman accrue to her father's group and are members of his group and tribe for religious and political purposes … these rights and duties are transferred by Native law to another group only on contraction of a valid customary union whereby the woman's group receives lobolo from the other group and transfers the natural right to the woman's productive powers and her progeny to the group providing lobolo.
However, our courts are in favour of giving effect to the principle of the best interest of the child whenever the custody of the child is under dispute.
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In the case of Hlophe v Mahlalela, 29 the court applied the principle of the best interest of the child when the father of a minor child was seeking custody of his child based on the fact that he had partially paid lobolo. The court was afforded the opportunity to consider the award to a father of the custody of his minor children after the death of his wife. to the custody of a minor cannot be determined by the mere delivery or non-delivery of lobolo.
The custom of theleka has an impact on the custody of children held in terms of that custom because the children so held might be prevented from attending a school they are used to, or even the quality of the education they receive might be affected. In the light of the constitutional protection of the right to education, it becomes obvious that theleka carries grave implications. The right to education is protected in the Constitution 32 and is a universally recognised right. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that "education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". 33 Parents are vested with the prior right to choose the kind of education to be given to their children. 34 A similar provision is contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. This Covenant recognises the right to education and provides that education should be purposive and "directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of dignity". 35 It is submitted here that the right of the child to human dignity and other rights enshrined in the latter international human rights instruments would be violated if he or she were to be prevented from attending school just because of the incomplete payment of lobolo for the mother.
The following section analyses the concept of the best interests of the child.
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Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD) 458F-G.
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Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD) 458G-459C.
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Section 29 of the Constitution.
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Article 26 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) .
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Article 26(3) United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) .
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Article 13(1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) .
The best interests and wishes of the child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child 36 stipulates that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning the child. South Africa is compelled to implement the principle of safeguarding best interests of the child because it is a signatory to the convention. South Africa has gone a further step in promoting the best interest of the child by incorporating the principle in section 28 of the Constitution, which provides that "a child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child". It has been noted that it is not an easy exercise to determine the best interest of the child. Further, the question is exacerbated by the fact that the issue has not been given exhaustive treatment in South African, foreign or international jurisprudence. 37 Furthermore, the wording does not prescribe the range of factors that must be considered in determining what constitutes the child's best interests. 38 The imprecision that surrounds the concept has led one of the commentators to declare that it is indeterminate and working with it is similar to exercising "Solomonic judgment." 39 The other difficulty about the principle is that "what is best for a specific child or children cannot be determined with absolute certainty". 40 This is aptly summed up in the Constitutional court judgment in S v M. 41 There Sachs J acknowledged the indeterminacy of the notion of "the best interest of the child" and stated that it provides little guidance to those given the task of applying it. The learned Justice held that:
… it is necessary that the standard should be flexible as individual circumstances will determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child. Furthermore, the list of factors competing for the core of best interests is almost endless and will depend on a particular factual situation.
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Bennett observed that "according to the conventional wisdom in the 1930s, 1940s
and 1950s, customary law had no particular concern with the welfare of children.
36
Article 3(1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) . Instead its emphasis lay on deciding to which family a child should be affiliated". 43 It is a pity that even today the best interests of the child and the wishes of the child are not taken into consideration by those communities that practice the custom of theleka as a way of enforcing lobolo agreements.
The failure to consider the best interests of the child and the wishes of the child conflicts with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasises the significance of considering the opinion of a child when determining his or her best interests. The Convention stipulates that:
1 States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2 For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
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Similarly, the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights 45 stipulates that a child:
Considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding shall in judicial proceedings affecting him be granted and be entitled to request the following rights: a) To receive all the relevant information; b) To be consulted and express his or her own views; c) To be informed of the possible consequences of compliance with these views and the possible consequences of any decision.
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Bennett 1999 Obiter 146.
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Articles 12(1) and (2) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) . The provisions of the latter article have been incorporated in s 10 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005, which provides that: "every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able to participate in any matter concerning that child has a right to participate in an appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration". In a similar vein, section 31 deals with major decisions involving the child and stipulates that: (i)(a) Before a person holding parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child takes any decision contemplated in paragraph (b), that person must give due consideration to any views and wishes expressed by the child, bearing in mind the child's age, maturity and stage of development.
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Article 3 European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights (1996) In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating his or her own views, [an] opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.
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The provisions of the latter international and regional human rights instruments lead to an inference that the custom of theleka conflicts with them. The consideration of the child's opinion in matters affecting him or her is of crucial importance because it enables the court to be acquainted with the child's needs, problems and aspirations, the kind of relationship he has with each parent, and the child's personality. 49 In order for the opinion of a child to be considered, his or her age 50 and maturity 51 have to be considered too.
The following section discusses whether theleka custom constitutes abduction or not.
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Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999.
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Article 4(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).
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Article 4(2) 4(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990); see also a 19(1) which provides that "… no child shall be separated from his parents against his will, except when a judicial authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation is in the best interest of the child". . In these cases the courts decided to consider the maturity of the child rather than the age.
Does theleka constitute abduction?
Snyman defines abduction as:
[a] person, either male or female, commits abduction if he or she unlawfully and intentionally removes an unmarried minor, who may likewise be either male or female, from the control of his or her parents or guardian and without the consent of such parents or guardian, intending that he or she or somebody else may marry or have sexual intercourse with the minor.
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The theleka custom does not constitute abduction, because the action of the father or guardian of the wife to resort to theleka custom as a way of enforcing lobolo is not unlawful and it is permitted in those communities practising it. The intention of a person practicing theleka custom is to enforce lobolo agreement and not to marry or have sexual intercourse with the minor. Therefore, the argument that theleka custom constitutes abduction is not persuasive. It is submitted here that theleka custom does not constitute abduction.
The following section will discuss whether the custom of theleka constitutes family violence or not.
Does theleka constitute family violence?
The following acts are recognised as domestic violence in the Domestic Violence In the light of this definition the challenge is that some husbands believe that they are entitled to chastise or assault their wives physically because they paid lobolo for them. 54 Assault is a form of physical abuse that constitutes family violence. 55 The belief that it is permissible to assault or chastise women is exacerbated by a change in the practices regarding the payment of lobolo: nowadays grooms usually pay lobolo from their own pockets, rather than having their families pay lobolo for their first wives. 56 This tendency has led to the limitation of the groom's family's ability and willingness to intervene in the marriage and to end family violence. 57 Currie and Bonthuys 58 have aptly argued that the vulnerability of women to family violence has increased, as follows:
Because lobolo is paid to wives' fathers and is often spent shortly after being received, wives' families may be reluctant to allow them to return home when they suffer domestic violence because of their inability to return the lobolo to the husband. Thus women's own families may collude with violent husbands to trap them in abusive marriages.
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On the other hand, theleka custom serves as a way of stopping family violence. It is practiced when the husband has ill-treated his wife, especially by seriously assaulting her. The father or guardian of the wife may request a beast as damages from his son-in-law if the latter has assaulted his wife. The beast paid may be in excess of the lobolo originally specified. This purpose of theleka custom is good, because it reduces instances of family violence by demanding that the wrongdoer (the husband) has to pay damages if he has assaulted his wife.
It is noted that, despite its advantages, the custom has weaknesses. This is because the payment of one beast or two as damages for assaulting a wife might not be too difficult a fine for rich men. Thus a rich man could assault his wife repeatedly knowing that he will be able to afford to pay damages. This eventually might expose rural women to family violence despite the practice of theleka custom, which is otherwise designed to protect them.
The chastisement of a wife by her husband is a family matter that is generally regarded as a private matter and is not meant for the eyes and ears of outsiders, and communities disapprove of women who resort to public forums to deal with domestic violence. 60 A wife would therefore approach a traditional court only as a last resort. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Domestic Violence Act, which aims to provide speedy, effective and accessible relief to various complainants, Courts. This weakness is a matter of serious concern "if one considers the fact that almost 32 per cent of South Africa's traditional communities of about 35 million people live in the rural areas and therefore fall under the authority of traditional authorities". 64 As a result, it is submitted that there is a need to extend the authority to impose protection orders to traditional courts. At the same time it is also submitted that the custom of theleka does not constitute family violence.
The following section discusses what should be done about theleka custom in order for it to accord with the Constitution. As will be seen, it will be argued that the theleka custom ought to be developed. The obligation of courts to develop common law in the context of the section 39 objectives is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in section 39 (2) read with section 173 that where the common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.
The Carmichele case applies equally to the development of customary law. When a customary law rule deviates from the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove such deviation. 70 The development of customary law is important because "once a rule is struck down, that is the end of that particular rule, yet there may be many people who observe the rule".
71 Theleka custom is still practised in some communities 72 and it serves a twofold purpose, namely the enforcement of lobolo and the prevention of violence directed against married females.
Despite the good intentions underlying the theleka custom, it violates the best interests of the child because the voice of the child is not heard when the child is held under theleka, particularly in that it may interfere with the educational rights of the child.
Conclusion
As has been argued above, the rights of a child are still severely affected and not taken into consideration in those communities that practice the custom of theleka. It is submitted in this article that the custom of theleka as it is practised at present 
